Toward a New World Order 1990

"Toward a New World Order" September 11, 1990

H.G. Wells wrote a book published in 1940 entitled The New World Order. The book addressed the ideal of a world without war in which law and order emanated from a world governing body and examined various proposals and ideas.

 

A pivotal point came with Bush's September 11, 1990 "Toward a New World Order" speech (full text) to a joint session of Congress. This time it was Bush, not Gorbachev, whose idealism was compared to Woodrow Wilson, and to Franklin D. Roosevelt at the creation of the UN. Key points picked up in the press were:

• Commitment to U.S. strength, such that it can lead the world toward rule of law, rather than use of force. The Gulf crisis was seen as a reminder that the U.S. must continue to lead, and that military strength does matter, but that the resulting new world order should make military force less important in the future.
  
• Soviet–American partnership in cooperation toward making the world safe for democracy, making possible the goals of the UN for the first time since its inception. Some countered that this was unlikely, and that ideological tensions would remain, such that the two superpowers could be partners of convenience for specific and limited goals only. The inability of the USSR to project force abroad was another factor in skepticism toward such a partnership.
  
• Another caveat raised was that the new world order was based not on U.S.-Soviet cooperation, but really on Bush-Gorbachev cooperation, and that the personal diplomacy made the entire concept exceedingly fragile.
  
• Future cleavages were to be economic, not ideological, with the First and Second world cooperating to contain regional instability in the Third World. Russia could become an ally against economic assaults from Asia, Islamic terrorism, and drugs from Latin America.
  
• Soviet integration into world economic institutions, such as the G7, and establishment of ties with the European Community.
  
• Restoration of German sovereignty and Cambodia's acceptance of the UN Security Council's peace plan on the day previous to the speech were seen as signs of what to expect in the new world order
  
• The reemergence of Germany and Japan as members of the great powers, and concomitant reform of the UN Security Council was seen as necessary for great power cooperation and reinvigorated UN leadership
  
• Europe was seen as taking the lead on building their own world order, while the U.S. was relegated to the sidelines. The rationale for U.S. presence on the continent was vanishing, and the Gulf crisis was seen as incapable of rallying Europe. Instead Europe was discussing the European Community, the CSCE, and relations with the USSR. Gorbachev even proposed an all-European security council to replace the CSCE, in effect superseding the increasingly irrelevant NATO.
  
• A very few postulated a bi-polar new order of U.S. power and UN moral authority, the first as global policeman, the second as global judge and jury. The order would be collectivist, in which decisions and responsibility would be shared.